The Socio-Economic Rights and Accountability Project (SERAP) has filed an appeal against a judgment delivered on 5 May 2026 by the High Court of the Federal Capital Territory in Abuja, which awarded N100 million in damages to officials of the Department of State Services (DSS). SERAP has described the ruling as “a travesty and a miscarriage of justice.”
The appeal was filed last Friday, 8 May 2026, by Tayo Oyetibo, Senior Advocate of Nigeria, on behalf of SERAP. It is accompanied by an application seeking a stay of execution of the judgment pending the outcome of the appeal.
SERAP said that although the Notice of Appeal already filed will be amended once the Certified True Copy of the judgment is received, the current filings provide adequate legal protection for the organisation.
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Justice Yusuf Halilu had ordered SERAP to pay N100 million in damages to the DSS officials for alleged defamation, to issue public apologies, to pay N1 million in litigation costs, and to pay a ten per cent annual post-judgment interest on the damages until the full amount is paid.
In its Notice of Appeal, SERAP argues that the decision rests on fundamental legal and evidential errors that go to the root of jurisdiction and fairness in adjudication, and that the decision is therefore perverse and a nullity.
SERAP contends that the trial court relied on defective evidence, including a witness statement that was not sworn before a Commissioner for Oaths, which ought to have been disregarded. The organisation argues that this substantially affected the outcome of the case.
SERAP is asking the Court of Appeal to allow the appeal, to set aside the entire judgment of the High Court delivered on 5 May 2026, and to dismiss the substantive suit in its entirety for lacking merit.
SERAP argues that the appeal is not merely about the outcome of the case but about whether a court can validly sustain proceedings founded on a defective originating process, or impose liability where the legal thresholds for defamation have not been met.
According to SERAP, the judgment is legally defective, procedurally flawed, and unsupported by evidence, raising substantial questions of jurisdiction, defamation law, and constitutional and international fair trial standards.
SERAP argues that the court failed to apply the well-established objective test in defamation law, relying instead on subjective perceptions within the DSS rather than the understanding of ordinary members of the public.
The Notice of Appeal states that the lower court erred in law when it allowed the amendment of the Writ of Summons to substitute the name of a non-juristic person with a juristic person.
The respondents had initially filed a Writ of Summons against the Socio-Economic Rights and Accountability Project, a non-juristic person, and later amended it to substitute that non-juristic entity with the Incorporated Trustees of the Socio-Economic Rights and Accountability Project.
SERAP argues that an action commenced against a non-juristic person is fundamentally defective and does not constitute a misnomer which is capable of amendment, and that an amendment cannot cure a void originating process nor effect the substitution of a distinct juristic entity for a party that does not exist in law.
SERAP maintains that the lower court did not have jurisdiction to entertain the respondents’ suit.
SERAP further argues that the lower court erred in law in holding that the words complained of were published about and concerning the claimants personally, contrary to the established objective test for identification in the tort of defamation.
The organisation states that the lower court failed to apply the objective test laid down by the Supreme Court in previous cases, which requires that words be understood as referring to the claimant by right-thinking members of society generally, not by a specialised or institutional group.
The lower court erroneously relied on the subjective perception of the respondents and their colleagues within the DSS. SERAP points out that the lower court failed to consider the admission of the first respondent under cross-examination that she is not the only tall, dark-skinned, large woman in the DSS, and that the second respondent is not the only slim, dark-skinned man.
The publications complained of did not mention the respondents by name, rank, photograph, or any unique identifier, and the lower court failed to consider the pre-action letter from the DSS in which the DSS acknowledged that the publications were made of and concerning the DSS as an institution, not the individual respondents.
SERAP also argues that the lower court erred in law by relying on the witness statement on oath of the first respondent when the first respondent admitted under cross-examination that the statement was not sworn before a Commissioner for Oaths.
SERAP states that the law is settled that a witness statement on oath must be signed by the deponent in the presence of the person authorised to administer oaths, failing which the deposition shall be disregarded.
The first respondent admitted under cross-examination on 21 March 2025 that her witness statement on oath was signed in her lawyer’s chambers and not before the Commissioner for Oaths.
Despite this admission, the lower court failed to strike out or discountenance the defective witness statement and relied on it in delivering judgment against SERAP. SERAP argues that this constitutes a fundamental flaw and that the lower court’s decision is perverse and a nullity.
SERAP further argues that the lower court erred in law by failing to uphold SERAP’s defences of justification, qualified privilege, and fair comment.
SERAP gave evidence that the publication was substantially true with respect to an unannounced visit by DSS officers, concealment of identity, including signing a false name, refusal to show identification, and conduct that caused apprehension among SERAP’s staff.
There was also evidence that the publications were made by SERAP on an occasion of qualified privilege to inform the public about actions of state security agencies that reasonably appear intrusive and intimidating.
The lower court failed to apply the broad latitude afforded to fair comment on matters of public interest, including the principle that even gross exaggeration does not of itself render a comment unfair, and wrongly implied malice despite the absence of any evidence of malice on the part of SERAP.
SERAP argues that the lower court erred in law in awarding damages in favour of the respondents despite their failure to prove any actual harm, reputational injury, or financial loss attributable to the publications.
The respondents did not adduce evidence of any suspension, investigation, disciplinary proceedings, or professional setback allegedly caused by the publications, and called no witness from the general public to testify that the publications were understood to refer personally to them.
SERAP also argues that the lower court erred in law in holding that the respondents had the requisite legal standing to maintain an action for defamation against SERAP in their personal capacities, because the respondents’ case on identification was predicated solely on assertions that staff of the DSS understood the publications to refer to them.
SERAP states that the settled principle of law is that an individual member of a large class, body, or institution cannot maintain an action for defamation unless the words complained of clearly and specifically identify that individual.
The DSS is a large institution, and the words complained of did not specifically, directly, or uniquely identify the respondents.
Finally, SERAP argues that the lower court erred in law by failing to properly evaluate the totality of the evidence adduced by the parties, thereby arriving at findings and conclusions that are perverse and unsupported by the record.
The lower court failed to consider and give weight to material admissions made by the respondents, disregarded the uncontroverted evidence adduced by SERAP, failed to properly evaluate exhibits, and reached a decision that was against the weight of evidence and occasioned a miscarriage of justice.
In its application for a stay of execution, SERAP is seeking an order staying the enforcement of the orders made in the judgment pending the final determination of the appeal, as well as an order of injunction restraining the claimants from enforcing the judgment pending the appeal.
SERAP states that the effect of the decision is that the operations of SERAP, a leading accountability non-profit organisation committed to the promotion of human rights, the rule of law, transparency, and accountability in governance, will be severely disrupted if not entirely shut down.
If the judgment is executed, it would potentially cripple SERAP’s operations, leaving the organisation unable to meet its financial obligations to its employees, consultants, vendors, and implementing partners, with serious consequences for its continued existence and the livelihoods of those dependent on it.
Ongoing programme activities, including human rights interventions, investigations, and advocacy initiatives, would be abruptly halted, to the serious detriment of the communities and beneficiaries who rely on SERAP’s work.
Thousands of individuals and communities depend on SERAP’s work, including victims of human rights violations and beneficiaries of its advocacy, investigations, and legal interventions.
SERAP states that halting its operations would have far-reaching consequences for public interest work and access to justice in Nigeria.
SERAP is committed to pursuing the appeal diligently and in accordance with the rule of law, and argues that the case raises broader concerns about the protection of civic space, the ability of civil society organisations to operate without undue interference, and the importance of safeguarding public interest advocacy.
SERAP also argues that the enforcement of the judgment would deprive it of its constitutional right of appeal, as it would be unable to adequately finance the prosecution of its appeal, and that the balance of convenience is in favour of granting the application.
The original suit, number CV/4547/2024, was brought by Sarah John and Gabriel Ogundele, both officials of the DSS.
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